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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
based upon the procedural nature of the proceeding and not merely 
upon his counsel's failure to bargain properly as asserted by 
Appellee. Appellee claims that Appellant "has failed to overcome 
the presumption that his representation below was inadequate. 
(Opposition Brief, p. 35.) However, statements made by Appellant's 
attorney at the preliminary hearing (Prelim. Hearing Transcript, 
pp. 125-126, included in the Addendum as Exhibit "A") establish 
that Appellant's counsel was ineffective as follows: 
We came in here this morning with the understanding, and 
we have statements that Monte Johnston was going to take 
the stand and testify that Mr. Penman was the one who 
shot Mr. Nielson. he has now chosen to not appear and it 
appears now that the evidence that the State has before 
this Court is simply one of that he was a party and that 
he walked in. Of course, our position is that Mr. Penman 
is not the one who shot Mr. Nielson. This afternoon we 
would have attempted to research this more fully but our 
office, our library is torn up, we are in the process of 
moving. And because first of all we didn't anticipate 
that we would be at this juncture with only the evidence 
that he walked in there and a gunshot was heard, and 
because we don't have the access to our library we don't 
feel comfortable in fully representing our client and not 
being able to brief the issue. 
Not only was Appellant's counsel prevented preparing for the 
preliminary hearing and from addressing certain issues because 
1 
Johnston was absent and their library and office was torn up and 
they were in the process of moving, but they were also not notified 
by the state that Johnston absconded before being subpoenaed. 
Regardless of whether defense counsel's actions were competent 
or could be classified as sound trial strategy does not undermine 
the fact that both the Court and the Appellant were misled in this 
case. A defendant's attorney is required to "provide [truthful] 
counsel" whenever the attorney's client faces a substantial 
probability of the deprivation of his liberty (Utah Code Ann. § 77-
32-301(1)); that counsel is required to "provide investigatory and 
other facilities necessary for a complete defense" (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-32-301(3)); not merely a defense geared toward plea negotia-
tions; that counsel is required to assure undivided loyalty to the 
client (Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301(4)); that counsel is required to 
counsel and defend their client at every stage of the criminal 
proceedings (Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-304(1) (a)) . 
When decisions lead to the waiver of constitutional rights 
such as those involved with the waiver of self-incrimination, trial 
by jury and a voluntary or knowing plea, the defendant possesses 
the right to assist in his defense and to be truthfully counseled 
and fully informed of the nature of the case against him by his 
counsel (as well as the prosecutor) in order to make rational, 
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informed, voluntary and knowledgeable decisions concerning his 
legal options and the relinquishment of his liberty. Otherwise he 
is not acting freely. An assumption (like the one proposed by the 
plaintiff) that a defendant in a criminal case would have upon the 
advice of his attorneys (or full knowledge) pleaded guilty to a 
charge of murder even if he had been fully informed is an insuffi-
cient predicate for a conviction on that charge. See Henderson v. 
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 643-44, n.12 (1976). 
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in 
our jurisprudence. One of these is that where govern-
mental action seriously injures an individual, and the 
reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, 
the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be 
disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity 
to show that it is untrue. While this is important in 
the case of documentary evidence, it is even more 
important where the evidence consists of the testimony of 
individuals whose memory might be faulty, or who, in fact 
might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, 
vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. 
Greene v. McElrey. 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959). 
Appellant specifically stated on page 24 of in his principal 
memorandum as follows: 
At the time of the entry of his pleas, he believed that 
both Mr. Johnston and Mr. Lewis had turned State's 
witness and would be testifying against him. This was a 
significant factor in his decision to enter the plea 
agreement. 
Contrary to Appellee's assertion that Appellant would not have 
entered into the plea agreement even if he was aware of the three 
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documents he claims to have had no prior knowledge of (Appellee's 
Brief, p. 34) the state's case was relatively weak. The State's 
primary witness and the Appellant's accuser (Monte "Bo" Johnston) 
in addition to failing to appear in court to testify, also admitted 
to lying in at least one of his unsworn statements provided to the 
County Attorney's office and possessed a Utah arrest record for 
providing police with "false information." (R. 9.) 
Further, State's witness Rick Lewis testified falsely 
concerning his immunity agreement with the State and also possessed 
ulterior motives to testify. (R. 38-39.) 
Between the dates of November 1, 1987 and November 14, 1987, 
Midvale Police obtained confessions (for the same crimes in which 
the Appellant was charged and convicted) by two juvenile suspects. 
(R. 5, 6 and 78.) 
Moreover, there exists substantial exculpatory (or at the very 
least inconclusive) evidence concerning ballistic tests conducted 
by the Washington, D.C. FBI Criminal Laboratory as set forth 
herein. 
In short, there is very little if anything at all in the 
record other than testimony tainted by perjury that implicates that 
Appellant was even at the scene of the crime in question. There is 
no evidence whatsoever establishing that Appellant did more than 
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come into the possession of stolen property after the occurrence of 
a robbery-homicide committed by Rick Lewis and Monte Johnston. 
On the other hand, had the Appellant been aware that he was 
admitting to being a murderer he would have rather faced trial by 
jury than being branded with the stigma of committing a homicide 
which he did not commit. 
The fact that other charges may have been dismissed against 
the Appellant is irrelevant to the determination of this appeal, 
since the Appellant was nevertheless convicted as the actual 
murderer and, the State's representations in the plea affidavit and 
in their letter to the Utah State Board of Pardons addressing the 
State's inability to prove that the Appellant is the actual 
perpetrator of that homicide are meaningless as well as non-binding 
upon the Board of Pardons. In fact, the Utah State Board of 
Parsons notified Appellant that the criminal record in his case was 
"unclear" and "inconclusive" and, that that record would remain 
unclear and inconclusive unless the Appellant confessed to killing 
the victim in this case. 
The State is holding the Appellant accountable as the 
"shooter" and/or as the actual perpetrator of the homicide on the 
basis that the language of the plea agreement is ambiguous. The 
plea bargain is ambiguous in that it was conditioned upon the fact 
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that the Appellant would not be held accountable as the actual 
perpetrator (or "shooter") of the homicide but nevertheless, based 
upon the wording of the plea affidavit he is being held accountable 
as the trigger-man absent an admission by either himself or Monte 
Johnston to having killed the victim. 
In short, the issue of factual guilt has never been removed 
from this case. Moreover, the pleas would never have been entered 
had the Appellant been fully counseled by his attorney. 
II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT PREJUDICED APPELLANT AND A 
LEGITIMATE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT 
WOULD HAVE BOUND OVER THE DEFENDANT TO DISTRICT 
COURT IS EVIDENT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD. 
Admittedly, appellant's original counsel may have stipulated 
in good faith based upon the prosecutor's fraudulent representation 
that Johnston (the Appellant's accuser) was subpoenaed. However, 
neither the good faith of defense counsel nor the good faith of the 
prosecuting attorney is an issue in this appeal. Moreover, Monte 
Johnston absconded from Wyoming Probation Authorities the day prior 
to when he was to be served. Nevertheless, to assert that the 
Appellant has failed to show that Johnston's absence deprived him 
of the opportunity to show that another (i.e. Johnston) and not the 
Appellant committed the crime in question or, that all evidence 
tends to show that Johnston's presence at the preliminary hearing 
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would have been damaging, since only Johnston claimed that 
Appellant had actually shot the victim (Crim. Tr. 202), belies the 
fact that the purpose of the preliminary examination is to 
determine if a crime was committed and if Appellant was the one who 
committed it. 
The court determining probable cause was deprived an 
opportunity to view the Appellant's accuser's demeanor, and to 
ascertain the veracity of the Appellant's accuser. The Appellant 
was deprived an adequate preliminary examination into the charges, 
deprived an opportunity to address or impeach this witness, or to 
present evidence of Johnston's previous State criminal record where 
Johnston provided false information to police. In fact, the 
State's only other witness Rick Lewis, implicated Johnston as the 
perpetrator of the homicide. Had Johnston been present at the 
preliminary examination, the State would have impeached its own 
case in chief against Appellant: (one State's witness, Johnston, 
would have been testifying that the Appellant committed the 
homicide in question, while the other State's witness, Rick Lewis, 
would have been testifying that the Appellant did not, in fact, 
commit the crime). 
Further, the prosecutor's elicitation of false and/or perjured 
testimony from State's witness Lewis concerning his Meals with the 
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State," his failure to correct that testimony as well as defense 
counsel's failure to clarify the record concerning this matter also 
tainted the fact-finding process and probable-cause-determination 
function of the preliminary examination. 
To suggest as Appellee does that there is nothing to indicate 
that the circuit court, even if knowing of these improprieties, 
would not have bound over the defendant, ignores the fact that this 
very same court initially declined from binding the Appellant over 
on the homicide charge (Prelim. Transcript, pp. 124-132). The fact 
that the State was presenting ambiguous alternative theories of the 
crime and/or the Appellant's conduct affected the Court's decision. 
By bootstrapping in this manner, the State alleged that the 
Appellant was either a party to intentionally and knowingly commit-
ting the homicide or a party to the commission of a felony (either 
theft, burglary or robbery) where during its commission, attempted 
commission or immediate flight from the commission thereof the 
victim was killed. Or, that the Appellant aided, abetted, 
solicited or encouraged another to commit the homicide. These 
ambiguities have never been resolved irrespective of the 
Appellant's pleas in this case. 
Moreover, the State did not want Johnston present at the 
preliminary hearing as evidenced by their failure to issue a 
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warrant for Johnston's arrest after purportedly being subpoenaed 
and failing to appear. Further, as evidenced by the prosecutor's 
strenuous objections at the preliminary examination concerning all 
inquiry pertaining to this State's witness (Prelim. Transcript, pp. 
79-85, 92-95, 97, 98, 101). Furthermore, the absence of any good-
faith efforts to either locate him or to ensure Johnston's presence 
at the court proceedings also establishes the State's fear of 
having Johnston present at the preliminary hearing. 
"This is not a case in which [Appellant] challenges the skill 
and competency of trial counsel in the negotiation process or in 
advice given regarding acceptance or rejection of a proposed plea 
bargain" per se. State v. Colonna, 766 P. 2d 1062, 1068 (Utah 
1988) . Nor does the defendant lose sight of the fact that our 
state and federal constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea 
bargains. See id. 
To the contrary, the defendant clearly recognizes that our 
state and federal constitutions guarantees fair trials and that 
both constitutions still guarantee due process at critical stages 
of the criminal proceedings. This is a case where counsel was not 
given, and indeed, where it may have been hampered by the State. 
The defendant is not arguing that his counsel failed to bargain 
properly, but that he accepted a plea bargain and waived his right 
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to a fair trial without being fully informed of the full nature of 
the case against him. The pleas were entered without full 
knowledge. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT IS REQUIRED TO ENGAGE A DEFENDANT 
IN AN ELEMENTS COLLOQUY AND TO CORRECT OR CLARIFY 
AMBIGUITIES IN THE PLEA AFFIDAVITS. 
Appellee represents that the trial court is not required to 
expressly address all the elements of "Rule 11" (of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure) in the plea colloquy if they are specified 
in the plea affidavit. Appellant agrees. However, Appellant 
submits that while the trial court may not be required to expressly 
address all the elements of Rule 11. the court is nevertheless 
mandated to expressly address all the factual elements of the 
"crime" with the defendant. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-
13 (Utah 1987). 
The trial court is also required during the plea hearing to 
clarify "any omissions or ambiguities" as well as "any uncer-
tainties" in defendant's plea affidavit or otherwise arising in the 
plea colloquy. State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App. 1991) 
cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
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IV. APPELLEE'S REPRESENTATIONS PERTAINING TO THE 
BALLISTICS REPORT OMIT RELEVANT EXCULPATORY FACTS 
WHICH ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO AN INTERPRETATION OF A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Appellee asserts that the results of the FBI's ballistic 
examination could only be characterized as inconclusive or incul-
patory when in fact, appellee omits relevant exculpatory facts and 
portions of that laboratory analysis in support of that contention. 
Omitted Facts: The shotshell wad recovered from the 
victim while being similar in appearance with the type of 
wad commercially loaded by Fiocchi into shotshells like 
those submitted for testing also possessed identifying 
marks that "could not be associated with the marks left 
on wads test-fired" from the barrel of the weapon in 
question. 
Therefore, no conclusion could be reached as to whether the 
shotshell [specimen! recovered from the scene of the crime was 
fired from the alleged murder weapon. 
Further, no conclusion could be reached as to whether the 
shotshells allegedly recovered from the defendant or State's wit-
ness Monte Johnston were ever loaded into the rifle. (R. 240-41.) 
A medical examiner testifying at the defendant's preliminary 
examination testified that while possessing the ability to 
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determine the type of bullets or pellets in question failed to do 
so in this case. (Prelim. Transcript, p. 118, 11. 17-21): 
Q. Were you able to tell, again based upon your 
experience in this type of matter, what type of bullet or 
pellets they were? 
A. I'm able to do that but I must say I did not in 
this instance. 
Testimony was submitted at the defendant's preliminary hearing 
that at least one other person was armed with a shotgun during the 
commission of the crime. (Prelim. Transcript pp. 45-46.) 
Q. What about your brother [Rick Lewis], Devon? 
Did you have occasion to observe whether or not he was 
armed? 
A. Yes. He was carrying a 12-gauge pump shotgun 
Additionally, another shotgun rifle was recovered from 
Johnston's vehicle and based upon information and belief, a 12-
gauge shotgun shell (in addition to a 20-gauge shotshell wad) was 
recovered by Midvale police detectives at the crime scene. 
Additionally, other manufacturers of shotshells from different 
companies and different gauges of shotshells are also commercially 
loaded with nickel-plated No. #6 shot. No. #6 shot is a standard 
load for all gauges of shotshells.1 A metallurgical analysis of a 
]For example, other gauges of shotgun rifles are capable of 
firing No. 6 shot. 
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12-gauge shotshell loaded with No. 6 nickel-plated shot would, in 
fact, indicate close compositional association because both 
shotshells contain the same type of similar metals. 
Furthermore, Monte xxBo" Johnston, who initially provided 
information to authorities to the effect that the defendant shot 
the decedent with a 20-gauge rifle not only failed to appear in 
court but moreover possessed an arrest record for providing police 
false information. The only other State's witness providing 
testimony that the defendant was armed also provided false 
testimony in open court while under oath and in fact lied to 
authorities because he "feared going to prison." Det. Jerry 
Thompson in discovering Rick Lewis' true identity confronted him at 
that time (the following colloquy occurred between Lewis and 
Thompson): 
I then went down to the County Jail, where they were 
getting in the process of releasing Rick Lewis. At that 
time I confronted him with the story why he didn't tell 
me that he was Devon's brother, Kevin Baer. He stated: 
"I didn't think you would find out. I knew that I was 
wanted and would possibly go to prison and I guess I 
really didn't want to go there." . . . 
(Sheriff's Report, Case No. 87-114571, 2/11/88, at p. 2, included 
in the addendum as Exhibit "B".) 
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V. APPELLEE'S REPRESENTATION THAT THE APPELLANT FAILED 
TO PRESENT AN ADEQUATE RECORD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
IS MISPLACED. 
From the outset (and barring the fact that the defendant's 
brief clearly references the record in this case), appellate 
counsel and the original state-counsel assigned to this case agreed 
that the entire record in this case (both of the criminal proceed-
ings as well as the record from the habeas corpus proceedings 
before Judge Bohling) would be made a part of the appellate record 
in this matter. 
It is, and was, appellate counsel's understanding that the 
clerk of the trial court would provide those records in their 
entirety to the appellate court for the purpose of this appeal. 
Accordingly, while it appears that there is some confusion 
concerning this matter, plaintiff's argument that appellate counsel 
has failed to provide the record or portions thereof in support of 
the defendant's claims is misplaced. This argument is also moot 
because this Court has ordered that the record be supplemented. 
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VI. DEFENDANT PROPERLY APPEALED FROM BOTH THE DENIAL OF 
HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AS WELL AS FROM 
THE DENIAL OF HIS PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS 
RELIEF. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, HIS CLAIMS WERE 
PROPERLY RAISED BELOW AND/OR ARE NOW PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT. 
The Utah State Supreme Court "has frequently held that while 
habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal (citation omitted), a 
conviction may nevertheless be challenged by collateral attack in 
'unusual circumstances' that is, where an obvious injustice or a 
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has 
occurred, irrespective of whether an appeal has been taken." Hurst 
v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). 
In Hurst v. Cook, the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
Numerous cases have arisen that have called in question 
the fundamental justice of a conviction where the 
issue [s] [were] not, or could not be, dealt with on 
direct appeal. Prime examples involve cases in which 
issues arise outside the record, e.g. the subsequent 
discovery of the suppression of exculpatory evidence 
the ineffective assistance of counsel 
especially in the investigation and preparation of a case 
. . . the discovery of new exculpatory evidence . . . and 
fraud committed upon the court by the knowing use of 
false evidence. . . . We have also found unusual 
circumstances and remanded for findings on the merits 
where the record was inadequate to determine whether the 
petitioner unintentionally pleaded guilty to a charge 
higher than he intended and failed to appeal because of 
his ignorance concerning his error. 
(Id. at 1036 n.6.) A collateral attack of this nature is 
appropriate. 
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Defendant presented the substance of his claims concerning the 
preliminary examination to the lower court in his motion to with-
draw the guilty plea. As stated in defendant's principal brief, 
"[j ] urisdictional issues may be raised for the first time on 
appeal." State in Interest of R.N.J.. 908 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) . 
Utah recognizes that the right to a preliminary examination is 
a substantial one. State v. Pay, 146 P. 300, 304 (Utah 1915) . 
Further, in Utah a preliminary examination is jurisdictional in 
nature. See State v. Freeman, 71 P.2d 196, 200 (Utah 1937). 
A preliminary hearing to ascertain probable cause to bind an 
accused for additional proceedings is a "critical stage of the 
criminal process" at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
obtains. In Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1200 (1973) the 
court offered the following guidelines regarding preliminary 
hearings: 
the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the prosecu-
tion's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to 
bind the accused over. Since the right to counsel is the 
right to effective assistance of counsel [judicial 
prudence] requires [the Court] to evaluate [Penman's] 
challenge with the increased solicitude appropriate when 
constitutional rights are at stake. 
Coleman v. Burnett, 477 Fed. 1187 at 1200. 
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Thus, a preliminary hearing is not only the occasion upon 
which the Government must justify continued detention by 
a showing of probable cause, but also an opportunity for 
the accused to rebut that showing. It is as much the 
arrestee's prerogative to endeavor to minimize probable 
cause as it is the Government's to undertake to maximize 
it, and that both sides must be indulged reasonably in 
their respective efforts. 
Id. at 1204. 
In sum, "the evidence" which alone must guide resolution 
of the probable cause issue is the whole evidence—for the 
defense as well as for the prosecution. The magistrate 
must listen to the versions of all witnesses and observe 
their demeanor and provide an opportunity to defense 
counsel to explore their account on cross-examination. 
The Sixth Amendment secures for the accused the assis-
tance of counsel at a preliminary hearing having for its 
purpose a determination on probable cause to hold him for 
further proceedings. Among counsel's potential contribu-
tions, the Court stated, is "skilled examination . . . of 
witnesses which may expose fatal weaknesses in the 
prosecution's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse 
to bind over the accused. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
[D] ue process demands more than the mere presence of 
counsel at the hearing. . . . [A]n accused is normally 
entitled to subpoenas compelling the attendance at his 
preliminary hearing of witnesses whose testimony promises 
appreciable assistance on the issue of probable cause. 
. . . [These principles do] not depend upon which side 
might have been expected to call the witnesses. 
Id.. at 1205. 
In this case, the State alleged Johnston was the only one who 
could identify the defendant as the one responsible for causing the 
death of Spencer Nielson. This witness did not testify at the 
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preliminary hearing. To the extent that hearsay is employed, the 
effort to establish probable cause becomes more prone to attack 
since the reliability of the absent hearsay declarant always 
becomes an added factor to be reckoned with. Id. at 1206. 
The Government's evidence at [Penman's] preliminary hearing 
was not only hearsay but also hearsay without any apparent means of 
refutation whatever. The constitutional guidelines set forth in 
Coleman have clearly been violated in this case. 
Finally, even if the defendant's IAD claims are improperly 
before this Court, his claims addressing the denial and deprivation 
of the preliminary examination is properly before this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Appellant asks this Court to 
vacate his conviction and order his release from custody and/or for 
any other relief deemed appropriate by this Court that is not 
prejudicial to the Appellant. 
DATED this / *f day of October, 1997. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN_& MARTINEAU 
By ^ ^ ^ 
Reed L/J&artineau 
Korey D. Rasmussen 
Attorneys for Appellant 
N:\222222\34\REPLY3.BRF 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /y day of October, 1991, I 
caused two true and correct copies of (the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT (Case No. 960639-CA, Utah Court of Appeals) to be served 
upon the parties listed below by placing true and correct copies 
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1 before? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q How many different occasions? 
4 A Several times. 
5 Q Was Mr. Johnston, did you have occasion to 
6 observe whether or not Mr. Johnston was armed? 
7 A Yes, I did. 
8 Q What did he have? 
9 A He had a mini 14 rifle. 
10 Q What is a mini 14? 
11 A It's a short rifle about the size of an M16. 
12 Kind of, it's shoots the same shells as an M16, it's 
13 semiautomatic. 
14 Q When you say short, can you describe the length 
15 of it? 
16 A Two and a half feet. 
17 MS. PALACIOS: I'm sorry, I didn't hear that. 
18 A Two and a half feet. 
19 MR. IWASAKI: What about your brother, DeVon? 
20 Did you have occasion to observe whether or not he was 
21 armed? 
22 A Yes. He was carrying a 12 gauge pump shotgun. 
23 Q What was— Describe it for me. 
24 A It was a single barrel single shot pump. The 
25 barrel on it was a 18 and a quarter, 18 and a half inches 
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1 long. 
2 Q Why do you say 18 or a quarter inch long? 
3 A Because it was over legal limit. 
4 Q To your knowledge the legal limit for sawed off 
5 shotguns was 18 inches? 
6 A I believe so. 
7 Q And this was specifically sawed off longer than 
8 that? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q So going back to when Mr. Johnston and the 
11 defendant enter in to the living quarters of Mr. Nielson who 
12 goes in first? 
13 A Mr. Johnston. 
14 Q How soon after does Mr. Penman go in? 
15 A Almost directly after. 
16 Q What do you see or hear at that time? 
17 A I here Mr. Johnston telling the guy to get out 
18 of bed. He did this a couple times, and I heard two 
19 gunshots. 
20 Q Pardon me? 
21 A I heard two gunshots. 
22 Q What kind of gunshots did you hear? 
23 A They was from the mini 14, Johnston's gun. 
24 Q You had been around firearms enough that you 
25 know the difference between a shotgun blast and mini 14 
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1 MR. IWASAKI: I'm going to object as to 
2 relevance as to what this has to do with Mr. Penman. Number 
3 two, that Bo, Monte Johnston is not on trial, is not a party 
4 to this action today, is not even a witness today. To try 
5 to have some sort of extraneous impeachment of another 
6 unnamed defendant and/or unpresent witness through the 
7 testimony of Mr. Lewis is entirely improper. If you're 
8 going to impeach, you impeach Mr. Lewis you don't impeach 
9 Mr. Johnston who hasn't testified. I object to relevance 
10 and improper the use of testimony by Lewis to attempt to 
11 impeach or to discredit someone who hasn't even been here 
12 today. 
13 THE COURT: What is the relevance of the line 
14 of questions? 
15 MR. BRADSHAW: Your Honor, the State elicited 
16 testimony that, in fact, according to this witness, 
17 Mr. Johnston and Mr. Penman were in the house at the time 
18 this individual was killed, according to this witness's 
19 testimony. I think the facts surrounding this incident in 
20 regards to Mr. Penman as well as to Mr. Johnston are 
21 relevant. I'm asking for his own personal knowledge of 
22 things that he observed. It goes to a number of the facts 
23 that'll be related. The question I'm asking right now about 
24 the chop shop, it'll relate to testimony elicited by the 
25 State concerning the stealing of the car prior to the 
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1 alleged homicide and burglary and robbery as well as to a 
2 number of other facts that later will be tied up. 
3 MR. IWASAKI: All of which have not indicated 
4 any reason to impeach Monte Johnston. He hasn't testified. 
5 Now if Monte Johnston has testified maybe, maybe you could 
6 get into prior wrongs but to try to elicit that from 
7 Mr. Lewis, that is not applicable. 
8 THE COURT: I agree. 
9 MR. BRADSHAW: Your Honor, I'm not attempting 
10 to impeach Mr. Johnston. What I'm attempting to do is to 
11 present to the Court so the Court can make a decision as to 
12 whether probable cause exists or not. The whole background 
13 of these individuals and what occurred at this date and 
14 immediately prior to this date. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Confine it to the 
16 incident in question and immediately prior to that. 
17 MR. BRADSHAW: Thank you, Your Honor. By way 
18 of background and for the Court, this is not involving 
19 anything that would be considered prior bad acts or anything 
20 of that nature. 
21 You met Bo, you lived with him and at some 
22 point during that time period you came to know Roger as 
23 well? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q That was through Bo? 
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1 MR. IWASAKI: He's asked him about this 
2 specific incident and I don't have any problem with that and 
3 that's as far as it should go. To put in an overflow and 
4 then say he's the leader on everything else that you all did 
5 without saying what everything else i s — 
6 THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the 
7 objection. I don't see any relevance to it and I'm not 
8 particularly interested in anything except this particular 
9 incident. 
10 MR. BRADSHAW: If I could respond briefly, 
11 Your Honor. The State as asking you to judge what occurred 
12 on this incident in a vacuum. I think in order to see what 
13 happened on this occasion you have to see the background, 
14 you have to see what has gone on before in order to see what 
15 happened on this occasion. 
16 THE COURT: Why? 
17 MR. BRADSHAW: Because to understand the 
18 dynamics between these people and what occurred. I mean the 
19 State, basically there is no testimony as to what occurred 
20 in relation to the homicide. The State is going to ask you 
21 to speculate in that regard. And I think in order to see 
22 the full picture you have to see the dynamics between these 
23 four individuals. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Iwasaki? 
25 MR. IWASAKI: I deny that the Court needs to 
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1 have any background as to dynamics. And furthermore I 
2 resent Mr. Bradshaw stating the State's position is that I 
3 am going to ask you to speculate. You can read the 
4 Information and you know the law as well as anybody, Judge. 
5 And I charged these parties and we needn't have to go in to 
6 any specificity as to who was inside and what they did 
7 because there were only two people that were inside that 
8 could testify about it and neither one of them are 
9 testifying today. 
10 THE COURT: The objection is sustained, 
11 Mr. Bradshaw. I don't want to hear about that. 
12 MR. BRADSHAW: On Hallowween, on this 
13 occasion, you went to the home of this individual, Lewis 
14 Torres is that his name? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And at that point DeVon and Roger and Bo were 
17 already there? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Was it a situation where the three of you 
20 approached Bo and talked him into not leaving with his wife 
21 and child to go to San Diego? 
22 A No. 
23 Q That was not the scenario? 
24 A No. 
25 Q In fact, when you arrived the plan was being 
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1 baked at that point; wasn't it? 
2 A I would say it was already made. 
3 Q It was already made and the maker of the plan 
4 was Bof Monte Johnston? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q And pursuant to that plan which he conceived 
7 you, not you but the other three of you, followed him to a 
8 truck stop where he dropped off his spouse and his child? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q And to the best of your knowledge they stayed 
11 there and waited for him while all this was going on? 
12 A Yes, I believe so. 
13 Q And subsequent to that again, at Bo's 
14 direction, you went to find another pickup truck? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q To steal a pickup truck? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q And again it was Bo was giving the directions 
19 as to where the truck, where you could find the truck and 
20 how it could be stolen? 
21 A That is true. 
22 Q And that is something you had a good deal of 
23 expertise in; isn't it? 
24 MR. IWASAKI: Objection. 
25 THE COURT: Overruled. Answer. 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q In fact, he gave you directions to a specific 
3 location; true? 
4 A Uh huh (indicating affirmatively.). 
5 Q He got out of the car and he drove up just 
6 minutes later with a pickup truck that you assumed he had 
7 stolen? 
8 A That's true. 
9 Q And he was driving that truck? 
10 A He was. 
11 Q And he drove that truck and you and DeVon 
12 followed in another truck? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q And at some point in Midvale you dropped off 
15 Devon's truck? 
16 A Uh huh (indicating affirmatively.). 
17 Q And all four of you climbed in to the truck 
18 with the handicapped license plates? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Prior to the time you arrived at the, at this 
21 location did Bo ever say anything to you in regards to not 
22 wanting to participate in this event? 
2 3 A No. 
24 Q How about in regards to just being a lookout, 
25 that he wouldn't be involved in the actual robbery or 
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1 A Not to ray knowledge. 
2 Q Sometime after that, after you had loaded up 
3 all of the goods in to the truck, you and DeVon were sitting 
4 in the cab of the truck I take it? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q And you overheard a conversation between Bo, 
7 Monte Johnston and Roger Penman? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q You assume it was Roger Penman? 
10 A It was the two of them. 
11 Q And at some point during that conversation you 
12 hear Bo, Monte Johnston say something to the effect of he's 
13 going to go back in to the house? 
14 MR. IWASAKI: Objection and move to strike. 
15 As you can recall the original testimony, Your Honor, 
16 subject to defense attorneys objections as to hearsay all I 
17 was able to establish was that a conversation occurred and 
18 he was unable to say who said what. And that was in 
19 response to objection by Counsel. 
20 THE COURT: That's correct. 
21 Q So I would ask the record to be corrected. 
22 MS. PALACIOS: We didn't object to hearsay. 
23 THE COURT: Now Mr. Bradshaw, your question 
24 again was, did he hear the conversation between Johnston and 
25 the defendant? 
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1 MR. BRADSHAW: I think the problem here is the 
2 characterization. I was not characterizing the prior 
3 testimony. If the Court wants I'll approach it from a 
4 different point of view. I don't think there's a problem 
5 here. I'll withdraw the question. 
6 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
7 Q You and DeVon were in the cab? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And you overheard this conversation? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q It's hard, I understand, for you to remember 
12 exactly who said what. That's true; isn't it? 
13 A That's true. 
14 Q But you do have a recollection of the gist of 
15 the conversation? 
16 A I got the meaning of it, yes. 
17 Q And you understood the meaning of that 
18 conversation to be that Monte Johnston, Bo was going to go 
19 in to that house and kill Spencer Nielson; didn't you? 
20 MR. IWASAKI: I object to that. He can ask 
21 him what the gist of the conversation is and I understand 
22 that there's a considerable leeway on leading on cross 
23 examination, Your Honor, but then he's characterizing which 
24 has not been brought out on direct. As you can recall the 
25 direct examination was a conversation was held, he didn't 
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1 know who said what but certain words were said and that was 
2 it. And then for Mr. Bradshaw then to say, then to 
3 attribute those things to Mr. Johnston based upon whatever 
4 understanding Mr. Lewis has of it is improper. 
5 THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. You 
6 can ask him what he heard each one say. 
7 MR. IWASAKI: For the record I would move to 
8 strike all this because it becomes very important later on 
9 if what we are looking at the record of Mr. Lewis's 
10 testimony. I would ask it be striken as a matter of law now 
11 and cannot be inquired into later if the testimony is to be 
12 used and read back via the transcript. 
13 MR. BRADSHAW: I would ask a chance to respond 
14 before the Court rules. 
15 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
16 MR. BRADSHAW: I'm not bound by Mr. Iwasaki's 
17 direct examination. I can ask him questions concerning 
18 things that he did not elicit. This is cross-examination. 
19 He testified, not in response to a direct question and we 
20 can play it back if the Court would like, although he could 
21 not remember exactly what was said he understood the meaning 
22 of what was said. And although he doesn't remember the 
23 exact words I'm asking him to relate, not in a leading 
24 question, but relate to us as to what he understood that 
25 meaning to be. That's not either overleading, I mean, I 
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1 don't understand the objection. There was about five 
2 objections there but I don't see any of them apply, I'm 
3 asking him his understanding of what the meaning of that 
4 conversation was. He testified he doesn't remember the 
5 exact words that were used. 
6 MR. IWASAKI: I have no objection to him 
7 asking his understanding. But when he says your 
8 understanding and then puts in to words via question his 
9 understanding without a response, then you've got a dual 
10 question. If that's the case I'll object to that. He can 
11 ask what his understanding was and let the answer come out. 
12 THE COURT: Answer what your understanding of 
13 the conversation was, Mr. Baer. 
14 A I understood that they was meaning to go in and 
15 finish Mr. Nielson off by murder. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. BRADSHAW: Okay, you say they. It was 
18 your understanding based on your hearing that conversation 
19 that in fact, Bo was the one who was going to do it; want 
20 it? 
21 MR. IWASAKI: Asked and answered. 
22 MR. BRADSHAW: Your Honor — 
23 THE COURT: He may clarify that. Can you 
24 answer that question? 
25 A I'm not sure, for sure. I cannot, definitely I 
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1 don't know. I assumed it was Bo at the time, yes. 
2 Q And you assumed it was Bo based on what you 
3 heard in that conversation? 
4 A Not really. I assumed it would be him just 
5 from the nature of the man. 
6 Q Was there anything in that conversation that 
7 indicated it was anyone other than Bo? 
8 A No. 
9 Q So what you heard was consistent with your 
10 conclusion that, in fact, it was Bo who was going to do that 
11 act? 
12 A Once again, I don't know really. I believed 
13 at the time it would be Bo. 
14 Q Again there was nothing in that conversation 
15 which led you to believe it was going to be anybody else? 
16 A There was nothing really in the conversation 
17 that led me to believe which one was going to do it. 
18 Q All right. After the conversation and they 
19 went in to the house you and DeVon remained in the truck? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Roger came out of the house first; isn't that 
22 correct? 
23 A I believe so. 
24 Q Let me ask you this: While you were in the 
25 truck you heard a shot? 
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1 A Yes, I heard a shot. 
2 Q You weren't able to see at all what occurred 
3 inside the house? 
4 A No, I wasn't, 
5 Q The next thing you saw was Roger coming out of 
6 the house? 
7 A Roger and Bo right after himf yes. 
8 Q But Roger came out first? 
9 A I think so, yes. 
10 Q You did not see Roger with the shotgun at that 
11 time? 
12 A I didn't see him have it, no. 
13 Q Although you didn't see what occurred you've 
14 testified that you assumed that Bo did it? 
15 A That's what I said, yes. 
16 Q And that assumption is based on a number of 
17 factors; isn't it? 
18 A Yes, it is. 
19 Q It's based in part on how you observed Bo 
20 beating Mr. Nielson prior that evening; is that true? 
21 A That's true. 
22 Q It's based in part on how you've seen Bo beat 
23 other people; true? 
24 MR. IWASAKI: Objection as to whether or not 
25 he had seen Bo beat other people. Move to strike. 
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1 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2 MR. IWASAKI: Once again prior bad acts. 
3 MR. BRADSHAW: It's based in part on your 
4 observance of, your observing Bo, Monte Johnston just prio 
5 to it and just prior to that shotgun blast you heard? 
6 A Just prior to a shotgun blast? 
7 Q Just prior and just after, you're observing 
8 him, you're seeing how he acted and what he was doing 
9 A It happened so fast I didn't really pick up t 
10 many vibs, I guess. 
11 Q It's based in part on your observance of thos 
12 two individuals not only on that occasion but prior 
13 occasions? 
14 MR. IWASAKI: Once again objection to any 
15 reference to prior occasions. 
16 MR. BRADSHAW: It's not asking for prior bad 
17 acts, it's just asking for interaction of those two. 
18 MR. IWASAKI: He's asking whether this guy h 
19 an opinion whether or not he assumes somebody killed 
20 somebody and then he says he's not basing it on any prior 
21 bad acts. Well of course he is. 
22 THE COURT: Would that answer be based on 
23 prior specific acts you had observed the defendant and 
24 Mr. Johnston do or just general observation? 
25 A It would be based on overall character, yes, 
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1 -which would mean prior acts and everything. Just the man in 
2 general. 
3 THE COURT: I'll let him answer. 
4 A What was the question? 
5 MR. BRADSHAW: The question was would this 
6 conclusion, this assumption you've made about who killed 
7 Spencer Nielson be based in part on your observing the 
8 interaction, the prior relating and observing of the two 
9 people, Roger Penman and Monte Johnston? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q After you left you and your brother were in one 
12 truck and the other two were in the other truck; is that 
13 true? Immediately after you leave the place, you all four 
14 go for like a block and then you split up? 
15 A We all went to downtown Midvale. 
16 Q There's really no conversation about what has 
17 happened? 
18 A Not really. We just, the extent of the 
19 conversation was meet back at the house. 
20 Q And you met back at the house and you loaded 
21 everything into Monte Johnston's truck? 
22 A We loaded it in to a tent then a truck. 
23 Q Then to Monte Johnston's truck. Then you and 
24 DeVon and Roger rode in one truck to Evanston? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 Q Basically the plan in Evanston was to get rid 
2 of the goods and to get rid of Monte Johnston? 
3 A Basically true, yes. 
4 Q And as soon as that was accomplished you and 
5 Roger and Devon hightailed it back to Salt Lake? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q None of you were interested in the proceeds 
8 from the heist? 
9 A Nof none of us. 
10 Q And certainly none of you were interested in 
11 being near or around Monte Johnston? 
12 A That's true. 
13 Q And in fact, Monte Johnston is the one who sold 
14 and received all the proceeds from this heist to the best of 
15 your knowledge? 
16 A To my knowledge he is the only one that sold 
17 anything. 
18 Q May I have a moment? 
19 THE COURT: You may. 
20 (Discussion off the record between defense attorneys.) 
21 MR. BRADSHAW: Just a couple of more 
22 questions. Were you contacted by Monte Johnston subsequent 
23 to his arrest on soliciting funds for bail or for anything? 
24 A After he was arrested? 
25 Q Yes? 
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1 A I was contacted, yes, 
2 Q Monte Johnston did call you? 
3 A No, he contacted me by letter or by mail. 
4 Q Do you still have that letter? 
5 A If I do I don't know where it's at. 
6 Q What was the gist of the letter? 
7 MR. IWASAKI: Objection, that's hearsay. 
8 THE COURT: How does that, can that be exempted 
9 from the Hearsay Rule? 
10 MR. BRADSHAW: I'm not sure it does. You 
11 testified that at some point, I think this was your 
12 testimony, well let me ask you this first: On this 
13 Halloween night was Bo, to the best of your recollection, 
14 wearing boots, cowboy boots, if you can recall? 
15 A I can't even remember. He was probably wearing 
16 combat boots but I'm not sure. 
17 Q You testified that Roger had a 20 gauge shotgun 
18 on that occasion. You saw that before you ever went to the 
19 storage shed? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Once this incident started, once you went in to 
22 the house did you see him with that shotgun at any time 
23 after that point? 
24 A Once we was in the house? 
25 Q Yes? 
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1 MS. PALACIOS: Okay, on the last page you say 
2 on the additional pellets exit the liver, additional pellets 
3 are found within the liver. 
4 A Right. 
5 Q So there were no exits— 
6 A No, Ma'am. 
7 Q Would that have any significance with respect 
8 to the distance that the shot— 
9 A No, actually it wouldn't in that shotgun 
10 pellets, particularly smaller ones such as this, are very 
11 unlikely to exit the body if one is shot in the trunk. 
12 Q Did you save those pellets? 
13 A I would take a representative sample and 
14 receipt those to the law enforcement agency. 
15 Q Did you do that in this case? 
16 A Yes, Ma'am. 
1^ Q Were you able to tell, again based upon your 
18 experience in this type of matter, what type of bullet or 
X9 pellets they were? 
%0 A I'm able to do that but I must say I did not in 
21 this instance. 
22 Q Okay. The injuries that you described you 
23 indicated there were some on the head and the neck and the 
24 face? 
25 A Correct. 
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1 THE COURT: You may. 
2 (Discussion off the record between Counsel.) 
3 MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, we have just reached 
4 a stipulation with the Prosecutor that the evidence that we 
5 would offer at this time is that if the authorities who 
6 performed these duties were called, and I believe it was 
7 Detective Thompsen and representatives of the County 
8 Attorneys Office, they would testify that Monte Johnston 
9 also known as Bo, was subpoenaed, served a subpoena to 
10 testify in this matter and I think that the record can 
11 reflect that Mr. Johnston is not present and Mr. Iwasaki 
12 indicates he has made no contact with their office and that 
13 would be our stipulation. 
14 MR. IWASAKI: That's correct, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: All right. 
15 MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, if I could at this 
17 time advise Mr. Penman. Roger, you have a right to make a 
18 statement at this time subject to cross examination by the 
19 Prosecutor. You also have a right to call witnesses on your 
20 own behalf subject to that same cross examination. What Jim 
21 and I advise you today is that you make no statement and you 
22 call no witnesses. Do you wish to follow our advice? 
23 MR. PENMAN: Yes, I do. 
24 THE COURT: Argument? 
25 MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, we have what we 
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1 think is a difficult issue here with respect to the Felony 
2 Murder Rule. We would request the Court to allow us an 
3 opportunity to brief this matter before we argue on that. 
4 MR. IWASAKI: I would object to that, Your 
5 Honor. This is a case in which the State has chosen to 
6 charge a second degree murdered based upon the various 
7 subsections therein, either as parties to intentionally 
8 knowing and committing the homicide or as parties to the 
9 commission of a felony, being an aggravated robbery, 
10 aggravated burglary. I see no reason to brief it. Of 
11 course, if the Court needs edification, of course we will 
12 but it appears to me this is a fairly straight forward case. 
13 I don't see the difficulties in arguing at this time. 
14 The evidence has been presented that a 
15 participant in the crime itself has given testimony as to 
16 what occurred and identified the Defendant as being party 
17 thereto. I've had value witnesses on the loss as to the 
18 thefts and that the value thereof of the items that were 
19 taken. I have a medical examiner who says cause of death, 
20 consistent with previous testimony, is that of a shotgun 
21 wound. I don't see the reason why we should have to brief 
22 this matter. Like I say, if the Court needs edification 
23 there's no problem. 
24 THE COURT: I don't think I need a brief. 
25 MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, we do and if I 
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1 could explain why. We came in here this morning with the 
2 understanding, and we have statements that Monte Johnston 
3 was going to take the stand and testify that Mr. Penman was 
4 the one who shot Mr, Nielson. He has now chosen to not 
5 appear and it appears now that the evidence that the State 
6 has before this Court is simply one of that he was a party 
7 and that he walked in. Of course, our position is that 
8 Mr. Penman is not the one who shot Mr. Nielson. This 
9 afternoon we would have attempted to research this more 
10 fully but our office, our library is torn up, we are in the 
11 process of moving. And because first of all we didn't 
12 anticipate that we would be at this juncture with only the 
13 evidence that he walked in there and a gunshot was heard, 
14 and because we don't have the access to our library we don't 
15 feel comfortable in fully representing our client and not 
16 being able to brief the issue. 
17 ^ THE COURT: I'll let them do it just so--
18 MR. IWASAKI: If I may respond to that, Your 
19 Honor. 
2 0 THE COURT: You may. 
21 MR. IWASAKI: The fact that their position may 
22 be that Mr. Penman didn't commit the actual homicide, didn't 
23 shoot anybody, is begging the question. There is no issue 
24 as to that. He doesn't have to be shown to be the one who 
25 is the trigger man in this matter. You know as well as I do 
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1 what parties are and that's all we're doing here. There's 
2 no doubt there was an Ag-robbery/Ag-burglary. There's no 
3 evidence to the contrary. And if it is a Felony Murdered 
4 Rule we don't have to. It would be a separate issue 
5 altogether and I have no objection to briefing it if the 
6 State charged first degree murdered in this matter. And as 
7 aggravating circumstances, alleged that it occurred in the 
8 course of the underlying felonies as we've said. But the 
9 fact that I haven't shown that Penman killed anybody 
10 specifically is irrelevant to this matter. The legal issues 
11 are clear on that. What good is briefing it going to do? 
12 MR. BRADSHAW: I take issue with that and 
13 that, in fact, is the point that we would wish to brief. I 
14 think there is little question that the Court would bind 
15 over on the aggravated robbery, on the aggravated burglary 
16 as a party to the offense but it does not follow that the 
17 Court has probable cause to bind over on the homocide. And 
18 what we would ask an opportunity to brief the Court on is 
19 precisely that issue, does party liability involved with 
20 aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary necessarily create 
21 the grounds for a bindover on the homicide. And we submit 
22 it's not and we would ask an opportunity to try to convince 
23 the Court of that as well. 
24 MR. IWASAKI: Even the examination of 
25 Mr. Lewis, Mr. Bradshaw went to great length to show what 
127 
1 general knowledge or assumptions there was of what was going 
2 to happen inside there and Mr. Lewis wasn't even inside that 
3 room. Mr. Penman was inside that room. So if knowledge and 
4 actual handling of anything that occurred in the room 
5 leading up to the murder there's two people that knew what 
6 happened in that room. Whether or not that's sufficient to 
7 bind over on the murder is begging the question once again. 
8 Of course there is. I'm not saying we're coat tailing this 
9 by the fact that we've proven an Ag-robbery/Ag-burglary. 
10 We've also shown someone died and he was one of two people 
11 that was in the room when the shotgun blast went out. I'm 
12 not bootstraping it. I have independent evidence of that 
13 and that's a party element as to the second degree murder. 
14 THE COURT: Isn't that true? 
15 MR. BRADSHAW: I do not think that makes him 
16 party to the second degree murder. If we're to find that 
17 he's— It seems to me there's two theories here and I think 
18 you have to clarify and that's why I think it needs to be 
19 briefed because this is a complex issue. The first theory 
20 which Mr. Iwasaki articulated initially seems to be because 
21 it's a burglary/robbery therefore, there's a felony murder 
22 rule in Utah and he's a party to the homocide. And we would 
23 take issue with that, say that's not true and would ask the 
24 opportunity to show case law to the Court on that issue. 
25 The second theory which the State has 
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1 articulated is he's a party to the homocide because he was 
2 in the room. In order to show he's a party to the homicide 
3 they have to show he had the mental state required for the 
4 offense number one. And number two, that he intentionally 
5 aided, solicited, encouraged, commanded that sort of thing. 
6 All we're asking for is an opportunity to brief the Court 
7 fully on what the proper standard is and brief those 
8 theories. Quite frankly, Your Honor, this is a complicate 
9 case because of the nature the way the evidence has 
10 transpired we would ask an opportunity to brief it to the 
11 Court. 
12 MR. IWASAKI: Counsel is making it more 
13 complicated than it is. It is uncontroverted on the 
14 testimony that Mr. Penman was in possession of that 20 guage 
15 shotgun and a shotgun blast went off in the room. So 
16 whatever assumptions for the purposes of this hearing can be 
17 made, Your Honor, I think they are making it much more 
18 complicated than it is for the purposes of this hearing. 
19 THE COURT: I kind of agree, Mr. Iwasaki, but 
20 I'm going to give them a chance to brief it to cover all 
21 bases. 
22 So that the issues are narrowed as to Counts 2, 
23 3 and 4 and 5 I find probable cause to believe that those 
24 offenses were all committed and that the Defendant committed 
25 them and order him bound over for arraignment on that 
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1 matter. I would give you, would a week be enough for submit 
2 your brief on Count 1? 
3 MR. BRADSHAW: The difficulty is, Your Honor, 
4 we are in transition right now. Our office is all torn up. 
5 We have a library sort of half way in. 
6 MS. PALACIOS: We have law clerks who are 
7 putting the library together. We apologize to the Court and 
8 we apologize to Mr. Iwasaki. 
9 THE COURT: You can't help that. How much time 
10 do you need? 
11 MS. PALACIOS: Two weeks. 
12 THE COURT: All right. 
13 MR. IWASAKI: If that's the case, Your Honor, 
14 he also has a request for disposition of detainers and 
15 that's another way I want this thing to go along in an 
16 orderly manner. 
17 THE COURT: All that's waived by their 
18 request. 
19 MR. IWASAKI: That's what I specifically want 
20 the record to show that the time from now until the time 
21 this is briefed and bound over that in fact, he is waiving. 
22 And I would like an oral agreement to that, that he's 
23 waiving that time as to disposition of detainers 
24 THE COURT: You understand that, Counsel? 
25 MR. BRADSHAW: We have discussed that with 
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1 Mr. Penman and he's ready to acknowledge on the record the 
2 two weeks that is required for the preparation of that issue 
3 on the interstate agreement on detainers would not count 
4 against his 180 days for request for disposition. 
5 THE COURT: You would have to give the 
6 Prosecutor time to respond too. 
7 MR. BRADSHAW: I assume another two weeks on 
8 that. 
9 THE COURT: So that would be four weeks 
10 then. 
11 MR. BRADSHAW: Are you willing to accept four 
12 weeks of time in terms of your interstate agreement on 
13 detainers would be waived? 
14 MR. PENMAN: Yes, I am. 
15 THE COURT: All right then. Brief from the 
16 defense will be due by the last day of this month, June 
17 30th. Response by the Prosecutor by Thursday, July 14th. 
18 MR. IWASAKI: And will we be notified of your 
19 decision by phone or are you going to reconvene? 
20 THE COURT: I'll have you reconvene and 
21 have the Defendant brought up. 
22 MR. BRADSHAW: Do you want to set a date for 
23 that now? 
24 THE COURT: By Thursday, July 21st. 
25 MS. PALACIOS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
131 
1 MR. BRADSHAW: What time would that be the 
2 21st, Your Honor? I'm sorry. 
3 THE COURT: 2:00 p.m. 
4 WHEREUPON, the proceedings were adjourned at 
5 the hour of 2:35 p.m. 
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2. WENDELL DEVON BAER 
DOB: 09-09-50 
N/A 
On 02-10-88 this detective made contact v/ith the Van Wert Ohio 
Sheriff's Office with a Captain Anderson, phone: (419) 238-3866. I 
inquired of him if he was faniliar v/ith thp npVnn napr fann'iv back 
there. I gave him an address of 
which was supposedly the parents of DeVon Baer, a Dan, and a Pearl. 
He stated that he was familiar with the family, has known them for 
many, many years. They have not seen DeVon for a long time. I 
informed him at that time that we had murder warrants on him, asked 
him if he would check and see what he could come up with. 
At that time he asked me if DeVon's brother, Kevin, was with him 
during that murder. I told him I didn't know that he had a brother. 
I told him we did come up with some identification of a name of Kevin 
Baer and that we had an individiial in our jail' who was going by the 
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Reporting Deputy 
Det. Jerry Thompson 141/D .', 
name of RICK LEWIS, that was called by everyone here as his brother, 
but he denies it, and that oir rap sheet shows him as a RICK LEWIS, 
however I asked for a description and also asked him to read me his 
fingerprint classification. He gave me his description of a KEVIN 
EUGENE BAER, with a date of birth *of as the same 
description as RICK LEWIS. The date of births are different. RICK 
LEWIS is using the date of b'rth of rather than 
The fingerprint classification that they read to me is exactly the 
same one as I have in Salt Lake. 
They also informed me that they have warrants out for him, that he is 
on NCIC, has been wanted since 1982, didn't show up for a sentencing 
to go to the state prison on a drug charge. 
At that time I told him that I would get right back with him . . if 
they would please send me their fingerprints and photo as soon as 
they could, that he was getting ready to get out of jail. 
I then went down to the County Jail, where they were getting in the 
process of releasing MR, RICK LEWIS. At that time I confronted him 
with the story why he didn't tell me that he v/as DeVon's brother, 
KEVIN BAER, He stated, "I didn't think you would find out . . I knew 
that I was wanted and would possibly go to prison and I guess I 
really didn't want to go there." He stated, "I still have not 
changed my mind, I will keep rn/ part of the bargain. I will testify 
and will do everything else thai; I told you I would." 
He was then informed that I had no control over the NCIC hit out of 
Ohio, that I would have to file that charge on him at this time. I 
would be in contact with him and my further contact would be with his 
attorney, Kevin Kamada, v/ho was also notified of the situation. 
A fugitive from justice warrant was obtained from Dick Shepherd at 
the County Attorney's Office and signed by this detective in from of 
Judge McCleave and served in the jail on 02-10-88. That was under 
case #88-11580, which a copy of that will be attached to this case. 
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Further communication will be clone with Ohio in the attorney's office 
to get the final disposition on the case and what they are going to 
do in regards to him. 
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